The necessary parties are those who should be present to issue the decree or order, and the relief sought should also be effectively enforced. In case of failure to add the necessary parts, the court may reject the application, because it is useless without deciding on the necessary parts, and the remedy will not bind itself to a rather lost vein. However, non-essential parts are those that have been added for irrelevant purposes and, therefore; No recourse or claim can be brought against them. Therefore, the existence of the necessary parties in a trial plays an extremely important role in the decision, as well as the effectiveness of the decree / order. The unlawful intervention of a party in criminal or civil proceedings. In federal civil matters, Rule 21 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure governs incorrect combination. A party is deemed not to be joined if the intervention in a case violates the joinder permitted under Article 20 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a party is misconnected if the alleged claim against it does not result from the same transaction or event as the other defendants and there are no common questions of law or fact. An unrelated party may at any time request the court to withdraw it from the FRCP 21 application, or the court may withdraw a party on its own initiative. However, an error of law does not constitute a ground for dismissing the action in its entirety. [4] Returning to the plea in this case, three states set out a cause of action against the respondent Innis and are not falsely related to count one, which provides a cause of action against the defendant Smith. The fact that some or all of the uncertainties specified in the various counts were properly invoked as grounds for a particular objection and properly required an order in support of the demurrage cannot be relied on in support of the judgment based on the decision confirming the demurrage without leave to amend.
The refusal to grant leave for the amendment was likely based on the view that, in the circumstances invoked, Dr. Innis and Dr. Smith could not be joined as defendants in the same action. This position, as we have shown, is not sustainable. The judgment must therefore be set aside on the ground that it would be a misuse of powers not to authorise the applicants to amend in order to remove mere uncertainties in the wording of their pleas. (See [24 Cal. 2d 133] Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital (1941), 18 Cal. 2d 97, 104 [114 P.2d 1]; Olivera v.
Grace (1942), 19 Cal. 2d 570, 579 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328]; Wilkerson v Seib (1942), 20 Cal. 2d 556, 564 [127 P.2d 904]; Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. Sch. of Medicine (1942), 20 Cal. 2d 713, 719 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L.R. 1358].) The plaintiffs, husband and wife, joined Dr.
Joseph Smith and E.C. as defendants in a lawsuit. Innis, physicians and surgeons, who treated the plaintiff`s wife independently at different times and in different places, but the treatment of each, it is claimed, contributed to the aggravation of some of the injuries she had previously sustained. Mr. Innis filed a general and special application in which he stated as a ground for the special application that there had been an error between the respondents and the pleas and that uncertainties arose in various details. The applicant is appealing a judgment rendered following an order confirming the demurrage without leave to amend. In the Mordechai case (1933), op. cit. cit., 134 Cal. App. 755, the issue of impermissible consolidation of defendants was accidentally raised in response to an application for a change of jurisdiction by one of those defendants. The District Court of Appeals described the complaint in this case (p.
757) as “with four separate and distinct pleas against four different defendants seeking separate and different relief against each defendant because of the case specifically raised for him.” Having concluded that neither the first nor the second charge had raised a cause of action against anyone, the court added (p. 760): [24 Cal. 2d 132] “It is argued that the plaintiff had doubts about the defendant from whom he is entitled to appeal and that, for this reason, the combination is permitted under Article 379c of the Code of Civil Procedure. No party to the complaint alleges that the applicant had such doubts. On the contrary, there is no doubt about the complaint. Had the plaintiff now pleaded uncertainty as to whether the complainant or one of these named defendants [the defendants named in counts three and four] was responsible for the care of livestock, the combination of these defendants would have been permitted under the section of the Code. Not only does he not invoke uncertainty, but his assertions also confirm that there is no uncertainty. If other statements in the statement reveal that counts one and two could indeed have been considered alternative statements of the same plea against different defendants, and that counts three and four could also have been considered alternative statements of a single plea against different defendants, sufficient has been cited to prove that, In the opinion of the pleadings, the court correctly applied the law. and declared legal rules that do not contradict the rules mentioned here.
Implications which are contrary to these rules and which could arise if the language used were considered applicable to alternative explanations of a single plea against different defendants are rejected. This case of professional misconduct raises the problem of the correct application of the provisions of Articles 379a and 379c of the Code of Civil Procedure, which were added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1927 and concern the joinder of defendants, in the light of the provisions of Article 427 of the same Code of Civil Procedure on the joinder of pleas. The latter section was passed in 1872 and has not been amended since 1915, except in the cases mentioned below. Further; the CPC deals with erroneous links and non-memberships in Order I. As we have already mentioned, there will be no problem with regard to unnecessary parts; However, the necessary parties should be present in a trial and the notion of misstep and non-adherence always rests on the necessary parties. Simply put, we can say that joinder means adding a party to the trial, regardless of which parts are necessary or unnecessary. [1] The defendant argues that the requirement in Article 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the pleas provided for therein may be combined “must concern all parties to the dispute” controls the more liberal and more recent Articles 379a and 379c. A similar statement [24 Cal. 2d 128] was made in Peters v.
Bigelow (1934), 137 Cal. App. 135, 141 [30 pp.2d 450], with regard to the effect of Article 378 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the plaintiffs` association and was amended in its present form in 1927, as part of the same procedural reform programme in which Articles 379a and 379c were adopted. In examining the subsequent relationship between Articles 378 and 427, the Court ruled in that case (pp. 378 and 427). 141 of 137 Cal.App.): “It is clear that Parliament intended to amend section 378 in 1927 to exclude from the requirements of section 427 cases covered by the provisions of section 378. Any other point of view would not give effect to the amendment of Article 378 of 1927. In that case, the Court also found that the 1931 amendment to section 427 dealing with conspiracy cases did not serve to implicitly restore or repeal the requirement discussed here. In the present case, it must be held from the same reasoning that Articles 379a and 379c were not repealed by that amendment.
